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The role of routines, rules and habits
in collective learning: Some epistemological
and ontological considerations
NATHALIE LAZARIC*
Abstract. – In this article the role of habits, rules and norms for collective
learning will be discussed. These concepts, although usually shown as being quite
different, have certain similarities and complementarities. Routines and habits in
the Veblenian tradition are two inseparable notions. In Simon’s work, routines are
explained more as a cognitive tool to avoid exhaustive deliberation.  Rules and rou-
tines in Simon’s work are identified using the artificialist approach and defined with
analogy to the computer. This perspective, which is quite different to that proposed
by Veblen, can be used to explain human problem solving and bounded rationality
in organizations. The definition of routines from a cognitive perspective proposed
by Nelson and Winter in 1982 is far removed from the Veblenian legacy and
Simon’s work. Here the notion of tacit knowledge is introduced in order to show
that it is difficult to duplicate routines and that the artificialist approach cannot
always be used to tackle the many different kinds of knowledge anchored in
routines. Despite the important work conducted by Nelson and Winter, routines are
nevertheless difficult to decipher in organizations and their different ontological
levels (concrete  and abstract levels) can give rise to some confusion for observers.
For this reason, most authors now admit that it is possible to describe routines using
the concrete level on the one hand and with their formal representation on the other
(as a general rule). Notions of rules, routines and habits are sometimes assimilated,
sometimes distinguished/separated depending on the ontological or epistemological
level which is being referred to. Although the debate surrounding this issue is
important, it is crucial not to forget the existence of the cognitive and political
dimensions of every rule, routine and habit in collective learning. This is probably
the main conclusion of this article, beyond the epistemological and ontological
discussion.
Introduction
A number of contemporary economists have given thought to the question of rules and
conventions used by agents in order to take decisions and act in a non-stationary environ-
ment (Orléan, 1994; Dosi
 et al., 1996; Lesourne and Orléan, 1998). The question
involves many schools of thought from game theory, to the economics of conventions
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and the “regulation school” on to the evolutionary approaches. The objective is to iden-
tify constant behaviour types which occur at a specific time, in a range of situations and
which contribute to the coherence of economic exchanges. Norms, conventions, rules,
routines and habits can also be seen as coordination mechanisms which explain these
interactions beyond the standard paradigm, which sets price as the only mutually agreed
adjustment factor for agents.
The conventions described by Keynes (1973) attempt to decipher behaviour when con-
fronted with the unknown. Organisations based on the Veblenian tradition highlight the
reason why some habits, whether social or not, are an important factor in the behaviour
of individuals.  At a more microeconomic level, there are rules, routines and habits which
create decision-making and learning tools for individuals and firms.
The objective here is not to look at the interactions between collective behaviour and
individual action, as some authors have already done (Boyer, 1996); but merely to observe
the link between seemingly very similar notions: rules, routines and habits.  Routines are
in fact a very common expression employed in contemporary evolutionary theory to
account for knowledge and performance in firms (Cohen et al., 1996). But the same
notion is used quite differently in Veblen's earlier work and in Simon's perspective. In
effect, Veblen (1899), Simon (1945), and Nelson and Winter (1982) use these terms for
different applications and they draw on relatively dissimilar methodologies. These differ-
ences have even extended into recent work on the notion of routine (Cohen et al., ibid.).
As many authors have employed rules, from game theory to the economics of conven-
tions to mention only the main uses in economics, it is important to remember that rules
and routines can be either complements or substitutes, depending on the application
(Hodgson, 1997).
In what follows, I begin in Section 1 by giving Veblen's definition of routines and
habits and illustrate the similarity of these two terms in his work. Then, in Section 2, it
will be shown how Simon defines routines and habits in a common unorthodox way. His
methodology, inspired by artificial intelligence, has led to a very specific definition of
these terms. In Section 3, I turn to Nelson and Winter (1982) who based their work on
Simon’s theories, which they then redefined. Consequently, their definition of the notion
of routines goes well beyond the previous approaches. Finally, in Section 4, the different
ontological aspects of rules and routines will be highlighted and the distinct and comple-
mentary nature of these two concepts will be demonstrated.
1. Routines and habits according to Veblen:
Two inseparable notions
According to Veblen, man in society is governed by mental habits inherited from the past
and based on institutions. Man has instincts (“the instinct of curiosity”, “the instinct of
workmanship”, ...) and working practices linked to the community he belongs to.  These
“instincts” are ways of responding to different stimuli and give man a certain mental bent
or “habits of thought”. Institutions are a breeding ground for thought and so are a
dominant cognitive vehicle which has extended into society (Veblen, 1899). For Veblen,
social structure operates a kind of natural selection for “habits” allowing them to be
renewed. In this context, man is no longer defined as a rational and calculating “homo
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oeconomicus”, the way he is considered in neo-classical theory, but as a creature with a
coherent structure of inclinations and habits which are revealed and expressed depending
on the actions mobilising him (Veblen, 1898). To summarise, historical and social tradi-
tions have selected certain dominant cognitive schemes which frame current habits of
thought. Individuals have patterns of behaviour automatically activated and habits which
are mobilised daily. For Veblen, these routines and habits are closely linked and are two
sides of the same coin. This is particularly striking in his book “The instinct of work-
manship” (Veblen, 1914).
In this book, Veblen illustrates the evolution of knowledge and technological practices,
from primitive techniques rooted in a small community and transmitted by the elders, to
much more advanced skilled techniques, including invention and innovation which
mobilise specific routines and conventions at the same time. Professional dexterity
depends on habits and routines based in the execution of daily tasks:
“Workmanship proceeds on the accumulated knowledge so received and current,
and turns it to account dealing with the material means of life. Whatever passes
current in this way as knowledge of facts is turned to account as far as may be,
and so it is worked into a customary scheme of ways and means, a system of tech-
nology, into which new elements of information or acquaintance with the nature
and use of things are incorporated, assimilated as they come. The scheme of tech-
nology so worked and carried along in the routine of getting a living will be servi-
ceable for current advance in technological efficiency somewhat in proportion as
the knowledge so embodied in technological practice is effectively of the nature
of matter of fact” (Veblen, 1914, pp. 39-40).
Craftsmen accumulate empirical knowledge through daily experience. Different conven-
tions and beliefs can be included in this practice which allows different “habits of
thought” and different routines. The industrial revolution was to change these collective
ways of doing things to include  a rigorous management of working time, “time stan-
dard”, based on Taylorian principles and a non-theological vision of work. Nonetheless,
to a certain extent this revolution was relative, because the first industries depended
essentially on manual labour and even with the arrival of mechanisation, the practices
were still based in professional dexterity despite the fact that managers try to control
these specific abilities. As Veblen observes:
“Such a fashion of conceiving the operations and appliances of industry seems at
the same time to fall in closely with the men's natural bent as given by the native
instinct of workmanship; and fostered by the constant drift of daily routine under
the handicraft system this attitude grew into matter of course, and has continued
to direct man's thinking on industrial matters even long after the era of handicraft
has passed and given place to the factory system and the large machinery”
(Veblen, 1914, p. 236).
The way Veblen assimilates the notion of habits to that of routines is quite obvious here.
“Habits” are individual bents based on larger institutions that partly determine the indivi-
dual cognitive schemes and routines at a given moment. These habits are transformed
and evolve through a range of historic events that change them. Consequently, for
Veblen, routines are defined between instinct and tradition and are a certain way of doing
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things at a given time. For Veblen, both the cognitive aspect and the dynamic nature of
“habits” are important. This enables habits to be distinguished from a purely sociological
approach, describing the social structures of society 1.
Nevertheless, even though habits and rules have been used in the past to criticise the
proponents of standard rationality, today, these notions can be used to explain a whole
range of behaviour which manifests itself when individuals are confronted with risk or
uncertainty Hodgson (1997). Keynes (1973), for example, argues that in financial mar-
kets imitating a neighbour could be a rational strategy. Here, conventionally accepted
practices and habits were not simply rational calculation and optimisation, which is use-
less when confronted with the unknown, but simply imitation of neighbours. In fact, as
Hodgson (1997) has also pointed out, it is deceptive to apply the often-used argument of
“habits” as a means of tracing the limits of heterodox and orthodox fields of analysis.
Many authors, who have mobilised the substantive rationality of the individual and his
maximisation behaviour, have used more or less tacit rules. Game theory illustrates this
phenomenon. Here, agents are allocated certain ‘rules of the game’, which limit the
scope of their action before determining the particular strategy.
Although many economic approaches suggest the existence of rules, they differ in
nature. Certain rules determine economic behaviour and habits ex ante (game theory).
Others are constructed and induced by a range of interactions and historical processes
which must be understood. Basically, this means that in a market situation, individuals do
not follow predetermined rules that establish their behaviour, nor do they rely on compli-
cated calculations to adjust their behaviour and maximise their own utility. Instead they
follow social conventions and habits which are part of the normal running of any market.
The labour market is a typical case of habitual and non-formalised regulations, where
certain professional practices, certain habits and routines provide a pivot point for indus-
trial relations. This equilibrium point is central to many internal compromises within a
firm, in different trades, companies or in inter-firm relations 2. Del Sol (1999) illustrated
this with the example of the fishing industry. In particular, she focussed on the existence
1
 In effect the sociological notion of “habitus” seems at first to be very similar to “habits”. The notion of
“habitus” developed by the French sociologist P. Bourdieu is nonetheless different from the Veblenian notion
of “habit”. For Bourdieu “habitus” is a collection of social and cognitive attitudes which are part of a social
structure which imposes limits on the possible range of actions of the actors. The position of individuals, in
particular their social origins, influences their individual attitudes which themselves are subject to filtration
by a range of social institutions : standards, tacit and formal game rules, language and codes (in other words
the range of perception and appreciation blueprints) (Bourdieu, 1992). It can be seen that “habituses” even if
they are individual attitudes, are different because they are deeply rooted into social apparatus, institutions
and the social positions of individuals, without any consideration of how they evolve over time. Even though
Bourdieu’s approach is neither historical nor ethnological, his theories are interesting because they fill out
the notion of institutions and illustrate certain of their facets. Thus, tacit and formal rules are important and
filter individual attitudes while at the same time having a retroaction on social structures. 
2 For an example of the implementation of rules in inter company relations, see Cassier and Foray (1998)
on the good conduct rules in the case of biotechnology consortia trying to channel “free rider” behavior; see
also the step by step rule (Lazaric and Lorenz, 1998), the aim of which is to informally regulate the imple-
mentation of specific assets and allow progressive commitment to cooperation avoiding the abusive appro-
priation of any one of the partners.
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of rules allowing members of the crew to take a certain volume of the haul as payment in
kind. A Spanish ship owner tried to question the practice, known as “the feast”, and pro-
voked an unprecedented strike in a Breton company in France. In fact, as a number of
authors have pointed out, it is not only the professional market of small business
fishermen but every type of industrial relations which can be described as being situated
somewhere between custom and tradition (formal or informal rules). Further, the extent
of the institutionalisation and the codification in industrial relations, depends on the
country involved (Gouzien 1999; Del Sol, 1999; Hénaff, 1999).
Beyond the existence of rules, the question can be asked: What is their role in relation
to routines and habits and what are the links between rules, routines and habits? In fact,
following the ideas of Veblen, many authors have assimilated habits to routines (Hodg-
son, 1997; Del Sol, 1999; Gouzien, 1999). Habits, like routines, are attitudes and bents
that individuals follow without deliberation. They are traditions of behaviour rarely ques-
tioned by the individual because they are anchored in cognitive and social automatisms.
However, if habits are based on rules, the link between rules and routines is not auto-
matic. In addition, the relationship between habits and rules arises from a common form.
These notions are complementary but cannot be substituted for each other. Hodgson
recognises this:
“Rules are conditional or unconditional patterns of thought or behaviour which
can be adopted either consciously or unconsciously by agents. Generally rules
have the form: in circumstance X, do Y. Habits may have a different quality: rule
following may be conscious and deliberative whereas habitual action is characte-
ristically unexamined. Rules do not essentially have a self-actuating or automatic
quality but clearly, by repeated application, a rule can become a habit. Typically,
it is easier to break a rule than to change a habit, since our awareness of our own
habits is often incomplete and they have a self-actuating character because they
have become established in subliminal areas of our nervous system. However,
habits still have the same general form: in circumstance X, action Y follows (....).
Both apply to situations that, in essential terms are actually or potentially repeti-
tive and non-unique” (Hodgson, 1997, p. 664).
The link between rules and routines still needs to be examined. In particular, is there the
same complementarity between rules and routines as is found between habits and rules?
It could be thought that the answer is positive to the extent that, in the Veblenian tradi-
tion, routines and habits are notions that are interwoven, even virtually identical. In fact it
will be shown that the debate is not as simple as it first seems and that it depends strongly
on the epistemological approach used. For Simon, routines do not in fact have anything
to do with habits and are assimilated more to a mosaic of programs mobilised by the
individual. Let us examine this approach.
2. Simon's artificialist perspective: A new and controversial 
approach
In Simon's work individual habits are questioned in the same way. In Administrative
Behaviour (1945), Simon attempts to examine why habits prevent rational decisions.
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Habits are opposed to rational behaviour, because the period of hesitation preceding a
choice, a period in which the mind considers the different possible options and the conse-
quences of actions, does not exist. Instead, habits belong to a stimulus/response model
where the stimulus is sufficient to set off habitual behaviour without any further thought
or consideration. This mechanism economises on efforts made by the memory by elimi-
nating pure deliberation, because the simple recognition of a situation is enough to set off
the response (Simon, 1945). As we shall see, this definition of habit leads Simon to move
away from the Veblenian perspective given that he opposes it with an the analogy drawn
from computer programming.
Simon pursued the analysis of the individual and collective decision making process
by analogy with computer programs. According to him, a functional analogy exists
between the human mind, the computer and organisations. The organisation and its deci-
sion structure are considered to be a mosaic of programs. The rules in the organisation
are not fixed once and for all as a function of optimisation criteria, but are based on adap-
tive rationality (March and Simon, 1958) 3.  Simon's objective, which he was to pursue in
the work conducted with Newell, was to identify the formal rules that underlie all learn-
ing. In this concept, routines are the programs or the formal rules that must be identified
in order to understand organisations better (Newell and Simon, 1976).
In the opinion of March and Simon (1958) organisations have a limited capacity to
process existing information. In order to reduce this informational complexity, they
resort to “rules of thumb” or empirical rules. The organisation depends upon a hierarchy
and on its capacity to organise and distribute tasks within the company and use empirical
rules. This can create a rather stereotyped notion of a company organisation 4, reduced to
algorithms or software sub-programs centrally coordinated by a hierarchy (Barreau and
Eydoux, 1999; Lazaric, 2000; Mangolte, 1998). Simon fully assumes that every decision
– from the most routine to the most innovative – depends on programmed and so potenti-
ally reproducible decisions.
From these hypotheses, Simon and Newell then searched for the formal decision rules
used by company managers, which must be formalised to anticipate decisions in compa-
nies. Simon therefore sought empirical rules that oppose the rules of profit maximisation.
The game of chess is a perfect example to illustrate combined reasoning, heuristics and
emerging strategies.  The formal and simple logic of this game allows the emergence of
routines to be seen with increasing informational complexity. In other words, the game of
chess demonstrates routine processes where the player, faced with a multiplicity of pos-
sible options, will follow procedures and set up routines. Nonetheless, although these
formal rules can emerge during a game of chess, a number of authors have highlighted
the fact that transposition of the ideas into the organisational world is not always so
3 In effect, these authors consider a range of activities as routine when the choice has been simplified by the
development of a determined response to given stimuli: ‘‘If the search for solutions has been eliminated,
but choice still exists in the form of a routine involving systematic and clearly defined evaluation, the acti-
vities are described as routine”. (March and Simon, 1958, p. 142).
4 Opponents to Simon’s theories speak in this context about “thought Taylorism” to describe this project.
The firm here, is reduced to automatisms or formalisable rules which guide its behavior just as a computer
is guided by its software (see Barreau and Eydoux, 1999). 
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simple.  Coordination processes inside firms go beyond simple formal rules and depend
on conflict and negotiations, which should not be ignored. In short, these are the limita-
tions of the “artificialist” approach, because it is based on processes that are too far
removed from the real life of organisations. In the process of search for formal rules, it is
easy to forget the ubiquitous presence and fundamental ingredient of all learning: namely
tacit knowledge. This knowledge, which is articulated with difficulty if at all, is very dif-
ficult to transpose to computer language because of its implicit content.  But this kind of
knowledge (according to Polanyi’s terminology) is the very essence of all learning pro-
cesses which cannot be reduced to single non-ambiguous pieces of information (Lazaric,
1999; Lazaric and Mangolte, 1999).
It can be seen that Simon did not aim to capture real learning processes as they are
effectively encountered in firms. Rather, his aim was to understand decision making and
the implementation of viable automatisms avoiding expensive and non-operational deli-
berations. Routines emerge from these mechanisms as a by-product of other automatisms
defined in a restricted sense. The important point here concerns not the cognition or learn-
ing mechanisms, but the discovery of formal rules which allow the way decisions are
made by individuals to be understood as well as their  “execution scheme” based on
“procedural rationality”. Routines are thus defined by analogy with computational
mechanisms, in other words as formal rules. They are no longer the product of history, as
in the Veblen model, but are defined in an abstract and functional way within the fra-
mework of artificial intelligence (Mangolte, 1998).
3. Nelson and Winter's renewal of the routine approach
In 1982, Nelson and Winter defined the term organisational routine in order to account
for the process of innovation and change. In practice, contrary to the standard fra-
mework, firms do not have as their sole objective the maximisation of their profit but
rather they seek to obtain a “satisficing” level of profits in an unpredictable world.
This debate is not entirely new and much has already been written on the subject both
in past and in contemporary economic debate (Hodgson, 1994; Barreau and Eydoux,
1999). To summarise briefly, during the 50’s, Malchup (1946) and Friedman (1953) criti-
cised those who defended the principle of marginal calculation and showed that decision
making depended on routines and not on behaviour involving marginal calculation.
Lester (1946) conducted a study involving 430 company managers. The empirical results
from this study enabled the authors to conclude that company bosses do not use compli-
cated calculations to make decisions but instead rely on simple empirical rules. Nonethe-
less, their conclusions did not lead them to reject the neo-classical  model on decision
making but instead, paradoxically, to reinforce it. Malchup (1946) highlights that com-
pany managers are not always aware of the method they use to calculate. Indeed if they
follow routines at all it is to avoid more complex computation mechanisms. If they
follow informal rules, their final decision conforms to a true marginal calculation. The
criterion for maximisation of profits is in fact a routine process and Friedman concludes
that it doesn't matter whether or not they apply maximisation principle theories to the
letter; the final result is identical. Everything happens “as if ” the entrepreneurs were
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maximising their profits since those who don't do this cannot survive in a competitive
environment (Friedman, 1953).
Nelson and Winter take up the argument of “natural selection”. They underline that in
the long term, the firms which survive are those which have satisficing routines and satis-
ficing technology, and are therefore capable of generating sufficient profit in their envi-
ronment. According to Nelson and Winter, decision-making processes depend on
specific heuristics in a world of  bounded rationality. They refuted the criticism of
“natural selection”, arguing that the decision process cannot attain the ideal type which
standard theory would want.  Relying on the notion of the “bounded rationality” of firms,
Nelson and Winter have defined the organisational routines of the firm. Their argument
is not the Veblenian one, but rather relies on a heterodox model of the firm and in parti-
cular on a behaviourist perspective and on “bounded rationality”.
Routines are repertoires of knowledge partly activated  by the members of an organisa-
tion (Lazaric and Mangolte, 1999; Lazaric, 2000). They are the organisational memory
as a whole  and the daily knowledge mobilised by its members. So routines are simulta-
neously both a set of repertoires which are inert and temporarily dormant, and
knowledge which is used and performed daily.
It can be seen via these proposals that the chosen baseline is directed towards the
cognitive background which guides firms. But Nelson and Winter (1982) have chosen to
include the notion of tacit knowledge in their analysis, going beyond the inclusion of
knowledge which is explicit and can be formalised in the form of an algorithm. They
base their theory on the work by Polanyi (1958) illustrating the tacit character of
knowledge which resists the process of articulation and explicitation in the form, for
example, of natural mathematical or symbolic language, and in particular in the form of a
computer program. By basing routines in knowledge which is partly tacit, the Simonian
legacy is reinterpreted. It is true that companies rely on bounded rationality in the normal
running of affairs, however, these heuristics, which are partially tacit, cannot be exclusi-
vely represented as formal rules.
Cyert and March’s legacy (1963) which postulates the problem of coalition, conflicts
and bargaining inside organisations is also reinterpreted. In effect in Cyert and March
there is always a  potential internal conflict between members of the firm, defined as a
coalition and which has to cope with contradictory preference systems generating differ-
ent sub-coalitions. The conflict is the result of the different resources and goals inside
organisations. In order to prosper and to survive, the firm has to face these conflicts and
must achieve a “quasi resolution of the conflict”. That is to say that the political dimen-
sion may be a brake for economical development if the conflicts are permanent preven-
ting the firm from performing efficiently.
In order to focus on the cognitive dimension, Nelson and Winter propose the truce
hypothesis. In this hypothesis, conflicts must be canalised in order to see routines in
action. These conflicts exist but are seen as latent. They are set and considered outside of
any relevant time-scale, in order better to observe cognitive processes (Nelson and
Winter, 1982). In fact, this very convenient hypothesis allows the dynamic  study of col-
lective learning and also supposes that political processes are static. Although this pre-
mise seemed attractive it quickly drew criticism from a number of authors who remarked
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on the co-evolution of political and cognitive mechanisms (Coriat and Dosi, 1997;
Cohendet et al., 1995; Lazaric and Mangolte, 1998, 1999; Lazaric, 2000).
In effect, this hypothesis means that the interests, the conflicts and the discretionary
behaviour between the members of an organisation must be maintained within a certain
boundary. The social interactions of individuals and the set of agreements interwoven
between them are stabilised. This status quo makes it possible to study the cognitive pro-
cesses that are initiated, assuming that political processes do not interact with the reper-
toires that are created. The focus is on routines in operation and their mobilisation in a
competitive environment. In this case it is important to see how, when the firms activate
these routines, specific skills are created which can only be replicated with great diffi-
culty. This can be described as a neo-Schumpeterian perspective 5, where the focus is on
the supply of emerging products whilst ignoring the social context in which these skills
and know-how saw the light of day.
Nelson and Winter thus reformulated the notion of routines by basing their theory in
cognitive processes. This approach allowed them to differentiate their ideas from the
Cyert and March’s perspective and not to have to follow Simon's recommendations to the
letter. These authors focussed on the cognitive repertoires of the organisation and their
transformation over time. They also put forward an evolutionary concept of the firm
which is contrary to the stereotypical vision of the firm, which allocates production fac-
tors for which neither the material value nor the benefit is clearly understood (Nelson and
Winter, p. 63). They emphasised how simple empirical rules followed by firms could
have an impact on their performance and their long-term survival. This is one of the
reasons for the relative success of this approach, which generated a flurry of work on
skills and routines in firms 6. All of this very productive work on the notion of routine
had a rather varied impact on the diffusion of the notion.  In fact, each author reinter-
preted the notion of routines from a different perspective, which led to an attempt to sum-
marise it by the evolutionary school of thought 7. 
In a recent Santa Fe working paper presented by Cohen et al. (1996) various proposals
for the development of this notion can be identified:
1) Proponents of an extension of the Simonian and “behavioral” perspective, which
argues that routines should be studied from a basis of experimental economics, in
order to be used as a formal illustration of learning processes;
2) Partisans of an investigatory approach, such as “ethno-methodology”, who emphasise
that routines (which are partly tacit) can only be observed after extensive empirical 
5 Nelson and Winter indicate in the introduction to their book that the two authors to whom they were most
indebted were Simon for his concept on bounded rationality and Schumpeter for his non-static vision of
capitalism  (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
6 See Lazaric (2000) for a survey of the contemporary evolutionist work on the subject of routine and skills.
7 For example the  Egidi perspective is in the same spirit as the Simonian’s legacy, whereas the Warglien
approach is not very far from the Veblenian perspective and Dosi and Coriat are quite close to the Cyert and
March perspective in arguing for the co-evolution of political and cognitive dimension (Egidi; Coriat and
Dosi; Warglien  in Cohen et al., 1996).
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studies, the purpose of which are to make an inventory of the knowledge situated and
distributed in organisations 8;
3) Detractors of the Nelson and Winter approach, and in particular of the truce hypo-
thesis, who suggest that routines should be analysed and observed in their dual dimen-
sion and little is accomplished in evolutionary research which does not examine the
governance structure of collective learning.
The first two trends represent the positions held by the proponents of a need for a deeper
understanding of the cognitivist perspective on the one hand in the Simonian sense and in
the Veblenian sense on the other (to the extent that in the second case the social and phy-
sical environment of routines must be extended in order to understand their material
aspect and the role of objects or any other type of environment which could modify the
existing repertoires and thus the routines in operation). The directions of work are com-
pletely divergent and the methodologies different, since in the first case the objective is
to see concrete modes of expression of routines and in the second there are only abstract
representations.  In the third trend, the debate needs to be empirically or theoretically
enriched if one is to really grasp the co-evolution of the social and cognitive mecha-
nisms, thus leaving behind the legacy of  Cyert and March.
The Santa Fe group reached a rather vague compromise definition of routine based on
these divergent ideas:
 “A routine is an executable capability for repeated performance in some context that
has been learned by an organisation in response to selective pressures” (Cohen et al.,
1996, p. 33).
This definition implies the following two points:
1) routines are interconnected into broader learning processes and in particular into com-
pany performances, which cannot be ignored;
2) routines can be placed on two analytical levels between concrete forms of expression
and modes of representation. 
For analytical purposes the two levels are considered as one, which implies that each resear-
cher can focus on different levels without any existing hierarchy between the forms observed.
This allows the different methodologies to be reconciled without the definition of a “one best
way”. However the disadvantage is that there are no clear directives on the way to tackle them.
This methodological problem and the difficulties of apprehending the duality of rou-
tines from the concrete to the abstract levels will now be discussed in greater detail. It
will be emphasised that the difficulty in is not specific to routines, since the same prob-
lem and duality of debate can be found when considering the notion of rules. This is a
more general way of representing collective learning under different modalities and at
different ontological levels.
4. The different ontological levels of rules and routines
In the evolutionary literature on routines, it is quite common to highlight the different
levels of routines. To this effect, Winter clearly distinguishes routines in operation –
8 For a definition and discussion of the notions of situated and distributed knowledge, see Lazaric (1999).
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“a routine in operation at a particular site... a web of coordinating relationships connec-
ting specific resources” – from their abstract representation – “the routine per se – the
abstract activity pattern” (Winter in Cohen et al., ibid.).
Thus, on the one hand, there are concrete routine modalities which can be “recurrent
action patterns” and on the other a more general level for the expression of these patterns.
This distinction between concrete content and abstract form assumes that it is possible to
distinguish and observe repetitive situations put into practice by individuals in an organi-
sation and that they can be formalised. But, as Winter emphasises, this implies an
extreme simplification and a stripping down to bare essentials of repetitive situations,
because at a symbolic level, neither their benefits nor even the context when they first
appeared can be understood (Winter, 1994).
Several methodological problems can be identified here. Firstly, to what extent can
routines be apprehended by the actual observation of a team, for example? The implicit
contracts that individuals make with each other and their hierarchical superiors, the moti-
vation of individuals and the rules explaining their behaviour, all run the risk of being
rather vague. The “ethno-methodological” vision tends to  observe routines in action and
implementation without being able to grasp all the social and institutional compromises
arising from the past. Secondly, how can tacit knowledge be observed,  given that it is
distributed between the individuals and the organisation and given that by its very
essence it is not articulated? This knowledge can seem opaque to the observer even if
meticulous observational means are used.
Finally, the use of archives can enable the passage from the concrete modality to the
abstract at an empirical level to be observed, however this gives a rather fossilised vision
of routines without providing any understanding of the context of their emergence:
 “Patterns of action and their diffusion are hardly traceable and measurable over
long time horizons, while at least some kind of representations are usually
recorded in organisational archives. They may not tell us the story about routines,
but like fossil evidence, they supply important cues for understanding organisa-
tional evolution” (Warglien, in Cohen et al., p. 32).
It is easy to see the difficulty of the exercise whatever the ontological level we observe.
Routines in operation are difficult to tackle at a political or cognitive level. In order to
represent these notions either the symbolic level must be used, which massively simpli-
fies the process which is implemented, or the archive level, which gives a rather faded
image of the reality of organisations.
Despite these methodological problems, it seems important to distinguish the two
levels of routines and to highlight the observational limits for each level. These two
levels are more complementary than substitutable, despite their respective gaps.
To simplify the debate, a number of authors have suggested observing routines from
one side and rules from the other. Rules are defined as modes of expression abstracted
from routines and their representation system. Here it is possible to distinguish abstract
rules and concrete representations: namely routines. Rules and routines are observed in
their complementarity (Becker, 1998; Reynaud, 1998), as opposed to the Simonian
framework in which formal rules are assimilated into routines.
For B. Reynaud, the  procedures and algorithms which can be based on a computer
program are quite opposite from routines. The main difference between the two notions
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is the codified nature of the algorithm which is defined as a finite list of instructions to be
executed in a given order and which should give a result which can be reproduced in
other situations. Routine, on the other hand, refers to “a transformation device designed
to obtain a result” which is exclusively tacit. Routine is “a practical way of solving a pro-
blem for which rules give a theoretical, abstract and general answer. Rules are the bac-
kdrop of routines” (Reynaud, 1998, p. 473). Thus rules are not formal here but more or
less incomplete and more or less specified. Routines provide the pragmatic field of action
where interpretation can be made. 
Consequently, they can be compared to jurisprudence, which provides practical legal
solutions derived from habitual acts performed by individuals in society. These solutions
are complementary to the legal framework within which legal decisions are applied with
possible leeway for interpretation over time:
“Routines like habits also show their incredible capacity for adaptation to the
environment of the world of work. The law cannot make provisions for every pos-
sible situation any more than can collective bargaining or work contracts. How
can the infinite number of details concerning the daily life of employees be
resolved - their place of work, rest time, the size of notice boards, holiday or end
of year bonuses, clocking-in conditions....?” (Hénaff, 1999, p. 67).
Confronted with the incomplete nature of rules, the question can be asked what is the real
place left for routines?  Several issues should be raised here.  First of all, there is the tacit
nature of routines. Secondly, there is the definition of routines on the basis of rules,
which implies that this concept does not have any real autonomy and that it needs asso-
ciated notions – namely rules or habits – in order to be defined.
First of all, it seems relevant to emphasise that although tacit routines are not compa-
tible with algorithms, they are not exclusively tacit as suggested by Reynaud (1998). In
fact, routines include a whole range of non-articulable and articulated knowledge, mobi-
lised during the course of action and which are not entirely separable. A typical example
is the project team, which includes more or less formalised interconnected knowledge,
such as the rules for the preparation of future collective work sessions, and a set of tacit
knowledge, which is held by each member and is extremely dependant on the context in
which it was developed (Divry, 1998; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Tacit and explicit
knowledge are more complementary than substitutable and depend on specific processes
and incentive mechanisms within each firm to explain their tacit part (Divry and Lazaric,
1998; Denis and Lazaric, 1999).
Secondly it would seem futile to always want to define routines as an associated part of
rules, as does Reynaud, or in relation to habits alone (Hénaff, 1999). In effect, routines do
not only arise as part of the incomplete nature of institutions, nor can they be assimilated to
habitual actions; they have their own logic which cannot be ignored. If the labour market is
a good example of the interconnectedness of these notions, where institutional constraints
play a key role in firm practices, it is not the only environment where economic exchanges
occur. Other markets can suggest other processes and other political and cognitive dyna-
mics. In addition, the importance given to wage rules leads to an exclusive focus on the ins-
titutional and political content of these rules, ignoring their cognitive dimension.
Thus we think that it is important to differentiate these two notions and yet still to pay heed
to their complementarity. We believe that in certain cases, expression and representation
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should be differentiated, as Winter (1995) suggests for routines, and Reynaud (1998)
suggests for rules and routines, because such differentiation can clarify the debate from
an epistemological point of view. However, in practice it is very difficult to disentangle
them. The risk is that a continuum of empirical rules is observed that are more or less
explicit, more or less abstract, more or less reproducible and more or less interpretable
and whose content varies in accordance with the differing uses. Finally, we believe that
the duality of rules and routines (considering their political and cognitive content) must
be respected and that the “dosage” of the two contents depends on the situation. Rules
and routines are nonetheless the two sides of the same coin, much as is the case for habits
which include both knowledge and social and institutional compromises.
Conclusion
Several traditions can currently be used to study habits, rules and routines. One school of
thought, inspired by an ethno-methodological approach, aims to track the concepts longi-
tudinally in a Veblenian perspective.  A Simonian tradition  attempts to identify the pro-
cesses at a formal level. Dichotomy is found in recent work on routines where
researchers have not generally used the same methodology, but instead have adopted
approaches that are more or less formal, and more or less based on unwieldy empirical
investigations.  Paradoxically, when Nelson and Winter tried to break free from the Cyert
and March and institutionalist traditions by defining routines in relation to collective
learning in a Schumpeterian context, the dichotomy reappeared. This paradox is accepted
by evolutionary scholars who admit that the level of abstract representation differs from
its concrete expression. This argument, far from closing the debate, extends it to rules,
which can also be considered as the abstract representation of routines.
From an ontological point of view, rules and routines are definitely complementary.
However, if the same sort of complementarity is observed for rules and habits, the con-
cepts of routines and habits are nevertheless epistemologically distinct. This is because
Nelson and Winter have opened the debate more into cognitive dynamics whilst forget-
ting the social and institutional foundations of individual and collective behaviour inside
organisations. This is one of the crucial points of the debate as far as collective learning
is concerned. In effect, irrespective of the current epistemological dichotomy and the dif-
ferent levels of analysis, it seems highly unlikely that rules, habits and routines can really
be defined without situating them in both a cognitive and a political perspective.
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